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Knowledge sharing among vertically related ﬁrms is commonly regarded as a
key ingredient to eﬃcient buyer-supplier relationships. In particular, the dis-
closure of technical knowledge1 by a customer may increase the supplier’s pro-
duction eﬃciency. Kotabe et al. (2003) document this positive eﬀect empir-
ically for suppliers in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industry. Moreover,
increasing supplier performance usually translates into lower input prices or
enhanced input quality respectively.2 Thus, buyers indeed have an incentive
to disclose their technical knowledge to their suppliers.3
Frequently, however, ﬁrms purchase inputs from the same suppliers as
their rivals. If a common supplier is either not able or not willing to treat
obtained knowledge conﬁdentially, the leakage of knowledge to rivals may
dampen or even outweigh the gains from an increased supplier performance.
According to empirical evidence such concerns are ubiquitous. Grindley,
Mowery and Silverman (1994) report that manufacturers of semiconductor
materials and equipment (SME) were concerned over sharing information
with members of SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technol-
ogy Consortium) because they feared the disclosure of proprietary informa-
tion to their competitors. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and B¨ onte and
Keilbach (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrms which cannot protect their proprietary inno-
vations by strategic protection mechanisms, such as complex or idiosyncratic
production processes, have a lower propensity to engage in knowledge sharing
R&D cooperations with their suppliers.4
1Alternative types of valuable knowledge in vertical relationships are demand and cost
information, see Lee and Whang (2000) for a survey of supply chain information sharing.
2For instance, Dyer and Hatch (2004 a, b) relate Toyota’s superior quality- and proﬁt
performance to its more intense knowledge sharing with suppliers as compared to General
Motors, Ford and Daimler-Chrysler.
3Of course, a supplier may also have an incentive to disclose its knowledge to customers.
Harhoﬀ (1996), for instance, shows that a monopolist supplier may voluntarily disclose
knowledge to customers in order to induce process and product innovations by customers,
which in turn may enhance the demand for the supplier’s intermediate good.
4Firms may also engage in horizontal knowledge sharing with ﬁrms from the same
industry. Empirical evidence suggests that such direct transfer occurs (Appleyard 1996,
Sattler et al. 2003, Schrader, 1991). Jost (2005) investigates theoretically the limits of
2Of course, suppliers will try to meet such objections. Consider, for exam-
ple, the electronic manufacturer Flextronics who builds products for a bunch
of high-tech ﬁrms, including direct competitors such as Motorola and Eric-
sson. According to Flextronics’ management the company “had been able
to erect ‘ﬁre walls’ to prevent proprietary information from leaking between
competitors”.5 The credibility of such promises, however, is questionable
if the supplier beneﬁts from knowledge transmission. Then the disclosed
knowledge may be opportunistically misappropriated by the supplier, which
immediately raises the question of how much knowledge the buyer should
disclose in the ﬁrst place.
We seek answers to these questions by employing a four stage model. In
the ﬁrst stage two downstream ﬁrms, i.e. buyers, decide how much of their
proprietary technical knowledge they disclose to an upstream monopolist,
i.e. their common supplier. Any disclosed knowledge increases the supplier’s
production eﬃciency. In the second stage the common supplier decides how
much of one buyer’s knowledge it further transfers to the other one. In
the third stage the supplier sets its price, i.e. the buyers’ input price. In
the fourth stage the downstream ﬁrms compete in output-quantities. This
scenario is analyzed both for a one-shot buyer-supplier-relationship and for
repeated relationships.
The combination of potential supplier opportunism and downstream com-
petition is the key ingredient to our knowledge sharing model. Only few pre-
vious studies consider these issues. Baiman and Rajan (2002) address the role
of opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships. In contrast to our work they
focus on a bilateral buyer-supplier relationship in which the supplier misap-
propriates the information by using it for himself; for instance, the supplier
may emerge as a competitor to the knowledge sharing buyer. Their setting
thus reﬂects an arguably stronger and more costly kind of misappropriation
than our knowledge-transfer scenario.
Similar to our setting Li (2002) and Zhang (2002) consider informa-
tion sharing of competing downstream ﬁrms to a common supplier. In
their model, however, information is about demand or cost uncertainty. As
such horizontal knowledge sharing networks.
5The New York Times 2001, “Ignore the Label, It’s Flextronics Inside”.
3the supplier takes advantage of these informations to seek more rents from
its buyers, the latter suﬀer from disclosing their knowledge in any bilat-
eral buyer-supplier relationship. The leakage eﬀect of information from one
downstream ﬁrm to another is negative if demand information is at stake
but positive when it comes to cost information. In contrast, the disclosure
of technical knowledge in our model induces a positive eﬀect within the bi-
lateral buyer-supplier relationship (i.e. increased production eﬃciency and a
lower input price) whereas the leakage of technical knowledge always hurts
(beneﬁts) the revealing (receiving) downstream ﬁrm.
Harhoﬀ et al. (2003) propose that two downstream ﬁrms may reveal
their innovations because their common supplier may reﬁne them. Yet re-
ﬁnements are only proﬁtable in the case that both downstream ﬁrms adopt
the improved innovation. This in turn causes a downstream ﬁrm to reveal
its innovation if and only if it expects the other downstream ﬁrm to adopt
it too. Our study is in contrast motivated by the abovementioned empirical
studies that suggest ﬁrms to disclose their innovation speciﬁcally if these can-
not be adopted too easily by their competitor or if the innovation is treated
conﬁdentially by the supplier respectively.
Our study extends the scope of previous works as we analyze explicitly
the supplier’s incentive to behave opportunistically. Moreover, to behave
opportunistically either in a one-shot buyer-supplier relationship or in re-
peated relationships. Our results suggest that this distinction is crucial to
understand knowledge disclosure in buyer-supplier relationships. In particu-
lar we ﬁnd that buyers disclose their technical knowledge completely as long
as the common supplier does not transfer ‘too much’ of that knowledge to
their rivals. The supplier, however, has an incentive to give away all of its
knowledge to downstream ﬁrms. The announcement to treat the obtained
knowledge conﬁdentially (e.g. to install ‘ﬁrewalls’) is thus not credible6 (not
a subgame perfect equilibrium) and, anticipating that, a downstream ﬁrm
will not disclose any of its knowledge in the ﬁrst place.7
6Miliou (2004) investigates the welfare eﬀects of ﬁrewalls in a setting with exogenous
spillovers from a buyer to a vertically integrated supplier. However, he leaves open the
question of whether the supplier has an incentive to install a ﬁrewall.
7Thereby our results also indicate that the case of full knowledge sharing as analyzed
4These predictions change if the buyer can threaten not to disclose its
knowledge in subsequent periods. We identify two types of knowledge sharing
equilibria in the repeated game. In the ﬁrst one each buyer discloses its
knowledge completely whereby the supplier does not further transfer ‘too
much’ of it. In the second, more subtle one, each buyer, again, discloses
its knowledge completely but the supplier further transfers all of it. This
equilibrium occurs because revealing and receiving knowledge implies a net
beneﬁt for the downstream ﬁrms. Here, in fact, one buyer threatens the
other one by not disclosing its knowledge in future periods if it did not
receive an adequate amount of knowledge in return. Both types of equilibria
are stabilized by a larger technological proximity between the buyers and the
supplier and destabilized by the absolute value of knowledge.
The paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we set up the model. In
particular we derive the downstream ﬁrms’ optimal output quantities in the
fourth stage and the supplier’s input price in the third stage of the model.
In section 3 we analyze the downstream ﬁrms’ incentives for knowledge dis-
closure in a one-shot relationships. In section 4 we investigate the case in
which ﬁrms interact repeatedly. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We consider two vertically related industries where two ﬁrms in the down-
stream industry, i =1 ,2 transform the intermediate input produced by the
upstream industry into a ﬁnal output. The upstream industry is character-
ized by a monopolist supplier, u, as we are essentially interested in the case
in which downstream competitors are related to a common supplier.
Our model consists of four stages. In the ﬁrst stage each downstream ﬁrm
(buyer) decides how much of its proprietary knowledge it discloses to the up-
stream monopolist (supplier). This knowledge transfer lowers the supplier’s
production costs. Once the upstream ﬁrm possesses the new knowledge,
from i say, it decides in the second stage, whether it further transfers this
knowledge to j. In the third stage the upstream ﬁrm sets the intermediate
by Ishii (2004) will not be an equilibrium.
5input price and in the fourth stage the downstream ﬁrms compete in the ﬁnal
output market a la Cournot.
The upstream ﬁrm produces with marginal costs of production, c − Y,
where c is an exogenous parameter, c>Y,a n d
Y = t(αixi + αjxj),i =1 ,2,i  = j (1)
represents the amount of cost-reduction the upstream ﬁrm realizes due to
the knowledge transfer of the downstream ﬁrms. In particular xi (xj)m e a -
sures the size of i’s ( j’s) proprietary knowledge. The endogenous variables
αi ∈ (0,1),i=1 ,2, represent the fraction of x the downstream ﬁrms actually
disclose to u. The upstream ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from any amount of the down-
stream industry’s knowledge, however, might be technologically limited. The
parameter t ∈ (0,1) captures the degree of technological proximity between
the upstream ﬁrm and the downstream ﬁrms.
The downstream ﬁrms’ marginal costs of production are A+w−Xi, where
A is an exogenous parameter, A>X i, w is the intermediate input price and
Xi = xi + αjβixj,i =1 ,2,i  = j (2)
is the amount of cost-reduction each downstream ﬁrm realizes due to the sum
of its own proprietary knowledge, xi, and the fraction of its rival’s knowledge,
xj, that gets into its domain. The ith ﬁrm receives its rival’s knowledge
according to the fraction αj, the rival has previously revealed to the upstream
monopolist and the fraction βi ∈ (0,1),i=1 ,2, that is transferred from ﬁrm
j’s knowledge to ﬁrm i via the common supplier. According to equation (2)
the ith downstream ﬁrm will utilize all of its rival’s knowledge if αj = βi =1 .
This implies that these ﬁrms have chosen to follow the same technological
trajectories in the ﬁrst place. This presumption is in line with a recent ﬁnding
of Wiethaus (2005) who shows that competing ﬁrms indeed tend to adopt
identical R&D approaches8. Since we are interested in ﬁrms’ incentives to
disclose their proprietary knowledge but not in their incentives to create that
knowledge we will assume throughout the rest of the paper that both ﬁrms
8He also extends this ﬁnding to Kamien and Zang’s (2000) model according which the
authors had previously predicted that competing ﬁrms adopted diﬀerent R&D approaches.
6possess an innovation of given and identical size: x = xi = xj
9.
We summarize these considerations in the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions. The ith
downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt-function can be written as
πi =( P(Q) − (A + w − Xi))qi,i =1 ,2( 3 )
where P(Q)=a−bQ determines the price of the ﬁnal product as a function
of the ﬁrms’ joint output quantity, Q = qi + qj. We assume that both
downstream ﬁrms pay the same input price w, i.e. the monopolist supplier
does not diﬀerentiate the input price. Without loss of generality we assume
b =1 . Supposing that the ﬁnal product is produced with a 1:1 technology
(one unit of ﬁnal product requiring exactly one unit of input) the upstream
ﬁrm’s proﬁt-function is
πu =( w − (c − Y ))Q. (4)
Using the standard backwards induction procedure we ﬁrst derive the
ﬁrms’ decisions starting in the fourth stage. Diﬀerentiation of (3) with re-
spect to qi and qj respectively and then solving both ﬁrst-order-conditions




a − A − w +2 Xi − Xj
3
i =1 ,2 i  = j. (5)
where Xi, and Xj respectively, are given by (2). We assume that the down-
stream ﬁrms take the price of the intermediate input w as given.
In the third stage the upstream ﬁrm sets the intermediate input price.
Anticipating the downstream ﬁrms’ behavior in the ﬁnal product market the







2(a − A − w)+Xi + Xj
3
i =1 ,2 i  = j (6)
for Q in (4). Solving the ﬁrst-order-condition, ∂πu/∂w|Q=Q∗ =0 ,f o rw yields
the intermediate input price
w
∗ =
2(a − A + c − Y )+Xi + Xj
4
. (7)
9Firms’ R&D investments have been anaylized extensively by, among others,
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992) for the case of horizon-
tally related ﬁrms and by Atallah (2002) and Ishii (2004) for the case of vertically related
ﬁrms.
7By (6) and (7) it is apparent that a decrease of marginal costs in the down-
stream industry due to an increase in knowledge (Xi,X j) creates an addi-
tional demand eﬀect for the intermediate input which in turn increases the
monopolist’s proﬁt-maximizing price10, ∂w∗/∂Xi > 0, and its proﬁts respec-
tively. If the downstream ﬁrms, however, disclose their knowledge to the up-
stream ﬁrm this lowers also upstream production costs by Y = t(αix + αjx)
and, as a consequence, w∗. We will refer to this latter mechanism as the cost
eﬃciency eﬀect.
3 Knowledge disclosure in a one-shot rela-
tionship
We will investigate four scenarios when analyzing the remaining stages of the
game: In the ﬁrst one the parameter β is assumed to be exogenous because
the upstream ﬁrm does not deliberately transfer knowledge disclosed by one
downstream ﬁrm to the other downstream ﬁrm. Therefore, in this scenario
the game reduces to a three-stage game. In the second case the upstream
monopolist decides opportunistically whether or not to transfer the disclosed
knowledge at the second stage. In both scenarios the downstream ﬁrm is
supposed to maximize solely its own proﬁts when deciding about disclosure
of knowledge at the ﬁrst stage. In the third scenario we propose a cooperative
solution between the downstream ﬁrm and the upstream monopolist.
Absence of supplier opportunism In this section we analyze a down-
stream ﬁrm’s incentive to disclose its knowledge to the upstream monopolist
assuming that the latter does not behave opportunistically.11 In other words
the supplier treats disclosed knowledge conﬁdentially and does therefore not
take any action to pass on the disclosed knowledge to the other downstream
ﬁrm.
10Banerjee and Lin (2003) point out that this eﬀect raises a rival’s costs and may hence
stimulate downstream ﬁrms’ R&D.
11A customer’s expectation that a common supplier will not exploit the vulnerabilities
created by knowledge disclosure may be viewed as the customer’s trust in the supplier.
See e.g. B¨ onte (2005).
8In order to obtain the ith ﬁrm’s output quantity we substitute w∗ for w




2(a − A − c + Y )+x(2 + 7αjβi − 5αiβj)
12
i =1 ,2 i  = j, (8)
given the monopolist’s optimal price w∗ and prior to i’s knowledge disclosure
to its supplier. The parameters βi and βj take the value zero if the upstream
ﬁrm is able to keep the shared knowledge fully secret whereas positive val-
ues reﬂect the leakage of knowledge to downstream ﬁrms that is (here) not








j ) − (A + w
∗ − Xi))q
∗∗
i i =1 ,2 i  = j. (9)
Diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to αi yields
∂πi
∂αi
= x(2t − 5βj)
2(a − A − c + Y )+x(2 + 7αjβi − 5αiβj)
72
. (10)
Note that the fraction in (10) is strictly positive which means that the sign
of (2t − 5βj) alone determines whether knowledge transfer to the upstream
monopolist is proﬁtable from a downstream ﬁrm’s point of view. We state
this more precisely in
Lemma 1 There exists a critical level of knowledge leakage from the up-
stream ﬁrm, u, to the ith ﬁrm’s rival j, which determines whether the ith
ﬁrm discloses all or nothing of its knowledge to the upstream ﬁrm. Denoting


















i =1 ,i =1 ,2 i  = j.
Proof. By (10), ∂π/∂αi > 0 ⇐⇒ 2t − 5βj > 0, for all αi ∈ (0,1).
The intuition for this result is rather straightforward if we look at the
marginal eﬀects of knowledge disclosure by ﬁrm i on its own proﬁt and on

























































The direct marginal eﬀect of knowledge disclosure on ith ﬁrm’s own proﬁt
in equation (11) is zero. Consequently, the decision of the ith ﬁrm about the
disclosure of knowledge to the upstream monopolist is driven by a price
eﬀect and a strategic eﬀect. The sign of the price eﬀect in equation (11)
depends on the sign of the change of the intermediate input price: ∂w∗/∂αi =
−1
4x(2t − βj). This sign will be positive if the cost eﬃciency eﬀect,2 t,
is stronger than the additional demand eﬀect, −βj. The strategic eﬀect is
always negative because the ith ﬁrm’s knowledge reduces j’s production costs
and increases its output quantity respectively: ∂q∗∗
j /∂αi = 1
12x(2t +7 βj).
Obviously knowledge disclosure by downstream ﬁrms will not occur unless
the price eﬀect is positive.12
Thus, the sign of the marginal eﬀect of knowledge disclosure on ﬁrm
i’s own proﬁt is determined by the counteracting (positive) price eﬀect and
(negative) strategic eﬀect. In contrast, the marginal impact of knowledge
disclosure by ﬁrm i on the rival’s proﬁt is always positive provided βj  =0 .
The price eﬀect in (12) is positive because the price eﬀect is the same for both
ﬁrms and ﬁrm i will not have an incentive to disclose knowledge if this eﬀect
is negative or zero. The direct eﬀect is positive because ∂Xj/∂αi = βjx.
Rather counter-intuitively, equations (11) and (12) imply that the ith ﬁrm
will disclose its technical knowledge to the upstream monopolist being aware
that this beneﬁts its rival more than itself. However, according to Lemma
1 the rival must not beneﬁt too much. For example, given the parameter t
12The brackets indicate that we suppose a positive price eﬀect.
10takes the value 1, ﬁrm i will only be willing to disclose its knowledge if less
than 40% of this knowledge (βj < 2/5) leak out to the competitor.
Taken together, for any additional unit of knowledge a buyer i transfers
to its supplier it hinges critically on βj whether the additional demand of
ﬁrm j does not increase w∗ too much and, furthermore, the loss of ﬁrm
i’s competitiveness in the ﬁnal product market is not too strong. Thus,
downstream ﬁrms will disclose their knowledge if the upstream ﬁrm is able
and willing to keep the disclosed knowledge secret (β = 0) or if the level of
involuntary knowledge leakage is, at least, not to high, i.e. β/t < 2/5.13
Presence of supplier opportunism So far, we have assumed that the
upstream ﬁrm tries to treat shared knowledge conﬁdentially. We will now
endogenize β and allow for opportunistic behavior of the supplier. To derive
the upstream ﬁrm’s second stage proﬁt-function we ﬁrst substitute w∗ for w
in (6) to get
Q
∗∗ =
2(a − A − c + Y )+Xi + Xj
6
i =1 ,2 i  = j, (13)
the ﬁnal product production quantity, given w∗. Then, keeping in mind that





∗ − (c − Y ))Q
∗∗ (14)






αjx(2(a − A − c + Y )+Xi + Xj)  0 (15)
is non-negative, which brings us to
Proposition 1 The upstream ﬁrm will always transfer all of the knowledge
it obtains from a downstream ﬁrm, i,t oi s rival, j, i.e. β∗
i =1 ,i =1 ,2.
13A critical leakage level does also exist for knowledge disclosure in horizontal research
joint ventures (RJVs) between competitors. Atallah (2003) shows that ﬁrms will not
disclose their knowledge to their RJV partners (insiders) if leakage of knowledge to rivals
which are not RJV partners (outsiders) exceeds a critical level. The latter is increasing
(decreasing) in the number of insiders (outsiders).
11Proof. Straightforward by (15).
The reason for this result is the additional demand eﬀect. By comparison
of (13) and (15) it is obvious that for any unit of knowledge the upstream ﬁrm
transfers from one downstream ﬁrm to another, it increases the demand for
its own intermediate input proportionally. However, if the ith ﬁrm expects
that the upstream ﬁrm has an incentive to transfer all of the knowledge it
receives from i to ﬁrm j, i.e. β∗
j = 1, we can conclude with the following
Proposition 2 In the non-cooperative case the downstream ﬁrms will not
disclose any of their knowledge to their (common) upstream supplier, i.e.
α∗
i =0 ,i =1 ,2 i  = j.
Proof. Straightforward by Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Buyer-supplier cooperation As yet, we have assumed that the down-
stream and the upstream ﬁrm maximize solely their own proﬁts when decid-
ing about disclosure and the transfer of knowledge and our results suggest
that behavior causes a knowledge sharing dilemma. However, cooperation
between vertically related ﬁrms may help to overcome this dilemma. If the
upstream monopolist’s gain from knowledge disclosure is higher than the
downstream ﬁrm’s loss then the monopolist and the downstream ﬁrm might
agree on knowledge disclosure. The monopolist will compensate the down-
stream ﬁrm for its losses; any additional proﬁts might be split.
Such a solution is feasible if and only if the eﬀect of the downstream














∗ − (A − Y ))Q
∗∗ (16)
with respect to αi. Since downstream ﬁrms are symmetric we consider a
supplier’s cooperation with both downstream ﬁrms. Thus we calculate ∂(π∗
i +
π∗











= x(β +1 4 t)
(a − A − c + x(1 + αβ +2 αt))
36
. (17)
12In contrast to (10), (17) is strictly positive, regardless of the monopolist’s
further knowledge transfer, β. We can thus state
Proposition 3 In the cooperative (joint-proﬁt-maximizing) case the down-
stream ﬁrms will disclose all of their knowledge to their (common) upstream
supplier, i.e. α∗
i =1 ,i =1 ,2 i  = j.
Proof. By (17) ∂(π∗
i + π∗
u)/∂αi > 0, for all αi ∈ (0,1).
Reciprocal knowledge disclosure Our model is based on the assump-
tion that there is a unidirectional ﬂow of knowledge from downstream ﬁrms
to the upstream ﬁrm whereby the former beneﬁt from lower input prices.
One might argue, however, that a downstream ﬁrm may choose to provide
information to the upstream ﬁrm not only because of the price eﬀect but
also in the expectation that it will receive valuable information in return.
At least for the knowledge transfer between competitors the literature sug-
gests that “reciprocity appears to be one of the fundamental rules governing
information sharing” (Schrader, 1990, p.154).14
Let us therefore suppose that the supplier too possesses valuable technical
knowledge which, upon disclosure, may increase the production eﬃciency of
its buyers. Buyers still decide about knowledge disclosure in the ﬁrst stage
whereby the common supplier decides about disclosing its knowledge in the
second stage. The supplier could announce, for instance, that she will disclose
her knowledge to ﬁrm i only if the latter has already disclosed its technical
knowledge.
However, the disclosure of knowledge by the upstream ﬁrm leads to an
increase in the demand for the intermediate input (demand eﬀect) which in
turn increases the upstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Hence the supplier’s proﬁt max-
imizing decision is to fully disclose her technical knowledge to each of its
buyers, even if the latter do not disclose any of their knowledge. The sup-
plier’s announcement to refuse knowledge disclosure is thus not credible and
will therefore not aﬀect the buyers’ decisions. In contrast to pure horizon-
14Kultti and Takalo (1998) show that competitors have an incentive to share information
if the exchange is not too asymmetric.
13tal knowledge disclosure, reciprocity will not facilitate knowledge disclosure
from buyers to a common supplier.
4 Knowledge disclosure in repeated relation-
ships
We consider now the case in which ﬁrms interact repeatedly. In particular
we assume that the following (previously deﬁned) stage game is repeated
inﬁnitely: (1) downstream ﬁrms choose αi, (2) the upstream ﬁrm chooses
βi, (3) the upstream sets w and (4) the downstream ﬁrms determine their
output quantities, qi. We assume that with respect to the stage game’s third
stage and fourth stage no cooperation takes place, that is the stage game’s
subgame perfect equilibria as given by (7) and (8) remain unchanged.
What kind of cooperation is attainable in stages one and two of the in-
ﬁnitely repeated game? First, the upstream ﬁrm u can promise not to be-
have opportunistically by disclosing not too much of i’s knowledge to j, i.e.
βj  2/5t. That is the common supplier installs a weak ﬁrewall. Secondly,
even if u behaves opportunistically, i.e. βi = βj =1 , the downstream ﬁrms
may still disclose knowledge to the upstream ﬁrm, as the full transmission
outcome, αi = αj = βi = βj = 1 is Pareto superior to the no disclosure
subgame perfect equilibrium of the one-shot game. We will investigate these
settings in more detail below.
Weak ﬁrewall setting Suppose the following trigger strategy15 by the
ith downstream ﬁrm: in the ﬁrst period it fully discloses its knowledge to
the upstream ﬁrm, αi =1 .I nt h etth stage, if ﬁrm u has maintained a weak
ﬁrewall of βj ≤ 2/5t in all t − 1 periods then the ith ﬁrm plays αi =1 ;
otherwise it plays the subgame-perfect outcome of the stage game, αi =0 .
Since downstream ﬁrms are symmetric we suppose an identical behavior.
Then let π
2/5
u denote u’s weak ﬁrewall proﬁt, i.e. both downstream ﬁrms
15We employ trigger strategies to derive some basic comparative static results regard-
ing the stability of cooperative solutions. Abreu’s (1986 and 1988) optimal punishment
strategies would increase the stability of cooperative solutions relative to trigger strategies.
14disclose their knowledge and βj = βi =2 /5t; let π1
u denote denote u’s cheat
proﬁt, i.e. both downstream ﬁrms disclose their knowledge and the upstream
ﬁrm behaves opportunistically (βj = βi = 1) and let π00
u denote u’s proﬁt
if neither downstream ﬁrm discloses its knowledge to u.16 Computing the




















(a − A − c +[ 2+2 t]x)
2. (19)
The squared bracketed terms in (18) and (19) reveal that the upstream ﬁrm
has indeed a short-term incentive to behave opportunistically and to transfer






(a − A − c + x)
2, (20)
the upstream ﬁrm will suﬀer from this opportunistic behavior in subsequent
periods when the downstream ﬁrms withhold their knowledge. The supplier












u ,( 2 1 )
where δ =( 1− p)/(1 + r) is the common discount rate, p is the probability
that the game ends immediately and r is an interest rate. Solving (21) for
δ yields the critical discount factor to sustain the weak ﬁrewall equilibrium,
δw:
δw 
(5 − 2t)(10(a − A − c)+( 1 5+2 2 t)x)
2 5 ( 1+2 t)(2(a − A − c)+( 3+2 t)x)
. (22)
Proposition 4 Maintenance of a weak ﬁrewall, βi = βj =2 /5t and repeated
downstream knowledge disclosure, αi = αj =1 , is stabilized by an increase in
the technological proximity between the downstream and the upstream ﬁrm,
∂δw/∂t < 0, and destabilized by an increase in the value/amount of knowl-
edge, ∂δw/∂x > 0.
16Recall that for the supplier there is no need to promise a knowledge transmission
less than 2/5t because buyers themselves beneﬁt from disclosing their knowledge as long
as βi < 2/5t, i =1 ,2. If buyers are indiﬀerent about disclosing their knowledge to the
supplier (i.e. βi =2 /5t) we assume they will disclose.
15Proof. The derivatives are contained in the appendix.
The more the upstream ﬁrm is able to utilize the received knowledge
directly (via t), the more, of course, it will miss this knowledge in the
future once downstream ﬁrms withhold it. Therefore closer technological
proximity stabilizes a supplier’s non-opportunistic maintenance of a ﬁrewall.
On the other hand the upstream ﬁrm’s incentive to further transfer the re-
ceived knowledge is driven by the additional demand eﬀect which is of course
stronger the larger the amount/value of knowledge, x, that is transferred. Ac-
cordingly a larger amount/value of knowledge destabilizes non-opportunistic
behavior by the upstream ﬁrm.
Full transmission setting Suppose now the upstream ﬁrm behaves op-
portunistically, βi = βj = 1. However, a downstream ﬁrm may still disclose
its knowledge provided that it receives knowledge from its rival in return.
The downstream ﬁrms anticipate that the upstream ﬁrm acts as a knowl-
edge transmitter and may engage in (implicit) knowledge sharing with their
rival. In particular, the ith ﬁrm may employ the following trigger strategy: in
the ﬁrst period it fully discloses its knowledge to the upstream ﬁrm, αi =1 .
In the tth stage, if both ﬁrms, i =1 ,2, have fully disclosed their respective
knowledge in all t − 1 periods then the ith ﬁrm plays αi = 1; otherwise it
plays the subgame-perfect outcome of the stage game, αi =0 .
Let π11
i denote the ith ﬁrm’s proﬁt if both ﬁrms disclose their knowledge,
π01
i if only j  = i and π00
i if neither ﬁrm discloses its knowledge. Then by (9),

































By the squared bracketed terms in (23) and (24) it is apparent that for any
x>0,π 01
i strictly exceeds π11
i . This is due to the competitive advantage
the ith ﬁrm can achieve relative to its counterpart in the product-market if
j discloses but i withholds its knowledge. The squared bracketed term also
reveals that the incentive to deviate from the knowledge sharing strategy de-
creases the more the upstream ﬁrm can utilize downstream ﬁrms’ knowledge,
16as captured by a larger t. Finally note that the downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts of






(a − A + x))
2 (25)
are clearly smaller than those given by (23) and (24). The ith ﬁrm continues













where the discount rate δ is deﬁned as above. Solving (26) for δ yields the
critical discount factor to sustain the knowledge sharing equilibrium, δf:
δf 
(5 − 2t)(4(a − A − c)+( 1 3+6 t)x)
(7 + 2t)(4(a − A − c)+( 1 1+2 t)x).
(27)
Proposition 5 Full knowledge transmission, βi = βj =1 , and repeated
downstream knowledge disclosure, αi = αj =1 , is stabilized by an increase in
the technological proximity between the downstream and the upstream ﬁrm,
∂δf/∂t < 0, and destabilized by an increase in the value/amount of knowl-
edge, ∂δf/∂x > 0.
Proof. The derivatives are contained in the appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that downstream ﬁrms not only ben-
eﬁt directly from each other’s knowledge but also due the reduction of the
intermediate input price. Of course the latter beneﬁt occurs only to the ex-
tent to that the downstream ﬁrms’ knowledge lowers also the upstream ﬁrm’s
production costs, as captured by t. Hence technological proximity between
vertically related ﬁrms stabilizes knowledge disclosure via the cost eﬃciency
eﬀect (see (7)). In contrast a larger value of the information to be shared, x,
increases the downstream ﬁrms’ incentives to achieve a short-term competi-
tive advantage more than it increases the beneﬁt of the cost-eﬃciency eﬀect.
Thus more valuable information destabilize knowledge disclosure.
Comparison of the weak ﬁrewall and the full transmission equilib-
rium Which of the two equilibria is more likely to come about given that
17their stability is ensured by (22) and (27)? We would expect the Pareto-
superior setting to be chosen by the ﬁrms. By Proposition 1 the upstream
ﬁrm will certainly prefer the full-disclosure setting 2. It remains to be val-
idated which setting appears beneﬁcial from the downstream ﬁrms’ point
of view. We thus need to compare the downstream ﬁrms’ disclosure proﬁts
of the full transmission setting, π11
i as given by (23), with the downstream
ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the weak ﬁrewall setting. Let π
2/5
i denote the latter proﬁt,

















which is smaller than the proﬁts given by (23). Thus, downstream ﬁrms
tend to fully disclose their knowledge even under ‘opportunistic’ behavior
of the supplier. Obviously, in the full disclosure setting the behavior of the
supplier is not really opportunistic. In fact, each downstream ﬁrm anticipates
that it is ‘cheated’ in the same way by the common supplier as its rival.
The upstream ﬁrm acts as an intermediary that guarantees the complete
transfer of knowledge disclosed by downstream ﬁrms. Though downstream
ﬁrms could just as well engage in a direct (horizontal) exchange of knowledge,
the indirect exchange via the common supplier generates an extra beneﬁt: it
lowers the input price if t>0. This eﬀect stabilizes the knowledge sharing
equilibrium and does not exist in pure horizontal knowledge sharing.
5 Summary and Conclusion
We have analyzed the conditions for knowledge disclosure in buyer-supplier
relationships. The key feature of our model is the notion of a common sup-
plier through which knowledge disclosed by one buyer may leak out to the
other one. Downstream knowledge disclosure thus bears the risk of beneﬁt-
ting one’s rival. In such a setting the conditions for knowledge disclosure by
buyers (see Table 1, second column) are driven by the anticipated behavior
of the common supplier (third column) and the mode in which knowledge
disclosure takes place (ﬁrst column).


















buyer-supplier cooperation 100% 100%
reciprocal exchange 0% 0%
Repeated relationships
weak ﬁrewall∗ 100% 40%
full transmission 100% 100%
∗ The displayed results imply t=1, for details see Lemma 1 and section 4.
Table 1: Equilibrium solutions of the game’s ﬁrst stage (buyers’ knowledge
disclosure) and second stage (supplier’s knowledge transmission) respectively
If the downstream ﬁrm is conﬁdent that the common upstream supplier can-
not transmit ‘too much’ of the disclosed knowledge to its competitor, full
knowledge disclosure occurs even if the competitor beneﬁts more from this
more than the disclosing ﬁrm itself. In contrast, downstream knowledge dis-
closure will not occur at all if buyers anticipate opportunistic behavior of
their common supplier. In fact the supplier’s announcement to treat the
obtained knowledge conﬁdentially (to install a ﬁrewall) is not credible in a
one-shot relationship.
One way to overcome this knowledge sharing dilemma is buyer-supplier
cooperation (i.e. joint proﬁt maximization). The upstream ﬁrm can com-
pensate the downstream ﬁrm for its losses, as the supplier’s gain from knowl-
edge disclosure is higher than the buyer’s loss. On the other hand, reciprocal
knowledge exchange does not facilitate knowledge disclosure by downstream
ﬁrms. The upstream ﬁrm’s announcement to hold back its own knowledge
as a response of refused downstream knowledge disclosure is not credible.
In the case of repeated relationships we identify two possible equilibria:
19In the ﬁrst one buyers proceed with complete knowledge disclosure as long as
the supplier maintains a weak ﬁrewall. In the second, more subtle one, knowl-
edge disclosure occurs even under full knowledge transmission through the
supplier. Here the supplier acts as an intermediary for implicit downstream
knowledge sharing. Both the weak ﬁrewall and the full transmission setting
are stabilized by an increase in the degree of technological proximity between
the downstream and the upstream ﬁrm whereas they are destabilized by an
increase in the value/amount of knowledge. The latter suggests that a ﬁrm’s
disclosure of incremental innovations is more likely than disclosure of major
innovations.
As a by-product we provide an additional explanation for intraindustry
knowledge spillovers. These are usually regarded as an involuntary leakage of
knowledge. According to our results intraindustry spillovers may well be the
result of voluntary knowledge disclosure to suppliers and further knowledge
transmission respectively. A higher degree of technological proximity be-
tween customers and suppliers facilitates voluntary interindustry knowledge
spillovers as well as intraindustry spillovers.
Our model has several possible extensions. One can analyze, for instance,
how product diﬀerentiation aﬀects downstream ﬁrms’ incentives for knowl-
edge disclosure. In our model ﬁrms in the downstream industry make use
of one input to produce a homogenous ﬁnal product. This implies that all
ﬁrms in the downstream industry beneﬁt from lower input prices due to
knowledge disclosure in the same way. Suppose that ﬁrms in the down-
stream industry oﬀer diﬀerentiated products and that speciﬁc intermediate
inputs are required to produce them. Then, it is not guaranteed that knowl-
edge disclosure by one downstream ﬁrm leads to identical price reductions
for all intermediate inputs. Moreover, varying degrees of competition in the
upstream and the downstream industry may also inﬂuence the results. Fur-
thermore, our model with symmetric downstream ﬁrms can be extended to
one with asymmetric ﬁrms which diﬀer, for instance, with respect to their
ability to make use of the rival’s knowledge.
20Appendix




24(10((a − A)2 + c2)+f1 + f2 + f3)
(25(1 + 2t)2(2(a − A − c)+( 3+2 t)x))2 < 0,
where
f1 =( a − A)(25 + 24t +4 t
2)x  0,
f2 = ( 1 5+3 6 t +2 8 t
2)x
2  0,






24t(5 − 2t)(a − A − c)
(25(1 + 2t)(2(a − A − c)+( 3+2 t)x))2 > 0.




16(24((a − A)2 + c2)+g1 + g2 + g3)
(7 + 2t)(4(a − A − c)+( 1 1+2 t)x)2 < 0,
with
g1 =( a − A)(109 + 52t +4 t
2)x  0,
g2 = ( 1 2 7+1 4 8 t +2 8 t
2)x
2  0,






8 ( 5+8 t − 4t2)(a − A − c)
(7 + 2t)(4(a − A − c)+( 1 1+2 t)x)2 > 0.
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